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Evaluating the Risks
of Market Swaps
BY MAURICE

__.

E. STUCKE

ON SII)ER THIS SCENARIO:
Your client has spent the past decade battling its
competitor in two geographic markets. Neither
side is making headway in these two markets.
Both are losing money. But your client is deter-

mined to fight it out, hopeful that its competitor soon will
exit the market so that its margins can return to healthy levels. On a Saturday morning, your client telephones with
news of a breakthrough. Your client has agreed in principle
with its competitor to end the competitive war by swapping
markets. Each company will sell a limited amount of assets
to the other and withdraw firom one market, leaving the
other, in your client's words, "tile only game in town." In
drafting the proposed asset purchase agreement, your client's
corporate counsel is recommending a ten-year non-compete
provision and other restraints to prevent the competitor from
re-entering or assisting any other conpaiy rrom entering
die protected market. Although the asset swap falls below the

thresholds of the 1-lart-Scot-Rodiun provisions, your client
is calling to verify that this asset swap does not run afoul of
the antitrust laws. How should you respond?
The issue is whether suich an tsser swap between two competitors is (a) per se illegal under Section I of the Sherman
Act as , horizontal market allocation agreement, or (b) a
potentially legitinate sale of assets, the legality of which is
determiined under the Shrtman Act's rule of reason standard,
or the standard relevant to Section 7 of the Clayton Act.'The
case law and antitrust commentary on this issue vary. Some
courts and connentators argue that asset sales (including
sales with stringent non-compete provisions) invariably
should be subject to the more lenient rule of reason standard;
others suggest that a per se approach may be appropriate in
certain situations. The implications for your client of these
different analyrical approaches are significant in terms of the

Maurice E. Slucke Is an attorney in the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice. rho views expressed In this article are the
author's own end do not purport to reflect those of the U.S. Department
cf Just,ce. rthe Intomation rotating to the matter of U.S. v. villago voice
Media, LLCand NT Media. LLC.Cv. Action No. 1:03CV0164 (N.D. Ohio
2003), in which tile author participated. is train publicly available
sources,

available delenses.' low do you deterniie whether yntr
client is planning a tratnsaction that coutld le deemed to
unreasonably restrain trade, and, at worst, could result in a
criminal prosecuttion?
Divining the Swap's Purpose
As the Supreme Court has long held, territorial allocation
schemes between direct competitors are naked restraints of
trade with no purpose except stifling competition.' For exampIe, if your client and its competitor simply agree to allocate
certain markets or refrain from seeking business from each
other's existing accounts, these arrangements likely would
be condemned as per se illegal under the Sherman Act and
would expose your client and its executives to criminal liability.' As the FTC and Antitrust Division have inted in the
Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, the "liete cotrdination of decisions on price, output, customers, let ritories, and
the like is not integration, and cost savings withott itevgration ate not a basis for avoiding per se condmnai ion."
In a recent consent decree involving an asset swap, the
Antitrust Division said that it will "examine[ I the substance,
rather than the fiorm, of the parties' agreement inevaluating
its potential effect." ; Simply pill, the essential question that
counsel must ask a client that is proposing an asset swap
with a competitor is: What is the central purpose of the
transaction? Where the primary purpose of the transaction is
to eliminate competition by allocating territories, then the
asset swap likely will be treated as per se illegal. If the asset
swap is intended to, and likely will, promote competition and
benefit consumers through elliciency-generating integration,
then the swap (and any reasonably necessary ancillary noncompete provisions)7 probably will be analyzed under the rule
of reason standard.
There are five factors that will help to shed light on the
central purpose of the asset swap agreement, which, itl turn,
will help determine whether the per se or rule of reason standard is likely to be applied: (1) the pat-ties' business justification, (2) the nature of the assets transferred, (3) the structure
of the transition, (4) the likely impact oilthe market, and
(5) the terms of any non-compete provisions.
1.Parties'Busitiess Justification.The first question to
ask your client is why is it seeking to swap these assets with
its competitor? A valid business justification does not necessarily immunize a market swap from per se condenation.
But the absence of such a justification will certainly expose
the swap as a naked restraint of trade. What then are the
client's business justifications for withdrawing from this market? Are these reasons consistent with-and supported bythe client's internal documents (especially thtsC created
before the asset swap was contemplated)? How does the market swap, oti its face, appear to promote productivity and
enterprise?
For example, if your client tells yom that it wants to withdraw from this geographic market because it is too far from
its core markets atid, therefore, too expensive to support, do
r A 1.L
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your client's documents and past actions support this contention? Some questions to ask your client include:
L1When and why did your client first enter this "non-core"
market?

0 Has your client recently undertaken any action that would
suggest its commitment to stay or expand in this non-core
marker, such as a significant investment in promoting its
brand?
O3Is your client expanding into, or making significant investments in, other "non-core" markets?
\What prompted the idea of the asset swap: had there been
an internal review about withdrawing from the "non-core"
markct or did the idea suddenly arise after aconversation
with the other party's executives?
o3Do your client's documents consider the possibility of
withdrawing from the "non-core" market?
0 Has your client reviewed in the ordinary course of its
business the profitability of the "non-core" market? Just
what is it about the distance of the "non-core" market that
makes it too costly to support?
LI Ate the parties engaging in these swaps with other comletiors in other markers (which would make it look more
like an orchestrated market allocation plan than ad hoc
divestitures)?

[] What are your client's plans with respect t. prices, postasset swap, in its protected market?
These questions are nor meant to be exhaustive, hut to
illustrate the underlying theme: counsel must try to ascertain
any inconsistencies between tile client's current business justification for the asset swap and its past and current behavior (or future plans). If your client simply avers in an affidavit
that it unilaterally decided to withdraw from tie market
before it agreed to the asset swap, rhis justification, in all likelihood, will be unpersuasiveA
2. Nature of the Assets Transferred. A second factor in
divining the central purpose of tife t ransaction is deterntining what real assets, if any, are actually being transferred, If
real assets are being transferred, what are the parties' plans for
integrating these assets into their businesses; what, if any, efficiencies result from this swap, and how, if at all, will these efficiencies benefit consumers? Absent the transfer and meaningful integration of real assets, the asset swap looks more like
all agreement between competitors to withdraw from each
other's marker.
The Antitrust Division's recent Neu Times case is an
example of a swap ofinsubstantial assets that, in reality, was,
as the United States alleged, a disguised market allocation
agreenent, The defendants were tile two national chains of
alternative newsweekly publications that competed for several
years in two geographic markets: Cleveland and Los Angeles.
In October 2002, the defendants agreed to swap assets, with
NewTimes' acquiring certain assets in Cleveland front Village
Voice Media, which, in return, acquired certain assets in Los
Angeles from New Times. The day after agreeing to transfer
these assets, Village Voice Media stopped publishing its alterS8-

A N T I I R US T

native newsweekly in Cleveland and New Times stopped
publishing its alternative newsweekly in Los Angeles.
The defendants' written contracts, however, did tnot involve
the transfer or integration of any meaningful economic assets
associated with those shuttered alternative newsweeldies, New
Times sold its former competitor only the New Times L'4's
accounts receivable, customer lists, and advertising contracts.
Village Voice Media, in exchange, sold New Times only the
Cleveland Free Times's accounts receivable, customer lists,
advertising contracts, and street boxes. Each dcfendatttalready
knew its competitor's advertisers in both markets (as their

ads appear in the newsweekly) and had attempted in the past
to sign up the other's advertisers, The assets (primarily tie
accounts teceivable) actually transferred in Los Angeles
acconted, according to the defendants' calculations, for only
7 percent ofthe $11 milliot sale price in Los Angeles and 24
percent of the $2 million sale price in Cleveland.
The defendants' written contracts specifically excluded
from the sale most of the assets associated with the actual
operations and goodwill of the two shuttered newsweeklies,
notably: (I) the staff, (2) the back issues and archived tnaterials of the closed publications, including editorial articles,
photos, and art work, and (3) the logos, trade names, trademarks, and copyrights associated with the closed publications. New Timhes specifically retained the rights to its New
Times [A logo or "flag," and Village Voice Media specifically retained the rights to its Cleveland Free Times logo or
"flag," but both defendants were contractually prevented
from using, or letting anyone else use, these logos.
'File fact that tile defendatus in the New Times c4ise did not
exchange significant assets was one of tihe factors shat led tile
Division to conclude that tile purpose of the asset swap was
to eliminate competition in the alternative newsweekly mar-

kets in Los Angeles and Cleveland.'
3. Structure of the Transaction, A third ihctor in determining the central purpose of an asset swap is examining tie
structure and interdependence of the transaction. A "swap"
implies that the transaction iscontingent oti each party selling its assets to the other (and to no one else). The very
notion of a "swap" tends to support tile inference ofan allocation agreement, as it appears that each party is ceding one
market to the other.
Any inference that a mutual sale of assets between coom-

petitors is adisguised marker allocation agreement is reduced
when the parties do not condition each sale on the other, and
instead shop the assets in one or both of the markets to other
potential buyers. For example, your client agrees to sell its
New York assets to its competitor, but your client's competitor then auctions off its Los Angeles assets to the highest bidder. Even ifyour client ends up as the highest bidder for the
competitor's Los Angeles assets, you call argue to tile attittust

enforcers that the risk that some third parry could have putchased these assets is inconsistent with any agreement to
allocate markets, and that die acquisitions should be reviewed
under the rule of reason (or Section 7) standard. Yet, an auc-

lion process should nor automatically immunize an otherwise
illegal market swap. If the risk is very low rhat someone else
would acquire the auctioned assets, then the auction might
be treated as a sham.
The parties cannot escape antitrust scrutiny by structuring the asset swap in such away as to mask its purpose. For
example, in the New Times case, the defendants drafted two
assets in
separate asset purchase agreements: one for tile
Cleveland and the second for the assets in Los Angeles. But
both cLntracis contained nearly identical terms, and wete
execited Ilon tie samle day. The defendants also shut down
their :dtvrnative newswceklies within two days after both
agrenecnrs were executed. These factors strongly suggested
that the two contracts were interdependent. Any doubt, however, was eliminated when the parties included in each asset
purchase agreement a clause stating that the execution of
each asset purchase agreement was contingent on the execution of tile
other agreement.I
Likewise, staggering an asset swap (such as waiting a year
befbre selling the second half) will not immunize the swap
from potential per se condemnation. In fact, efforts to disguise a market allocation agreement could actually increase
the risk of criminal prosecution.
4. Impact on the Market, A fourth factor in examining the central purpose of an asset swap is its likely impact
on competition. Although the per se standard is designed
so that the courts need not "ramble through the wilds of
economlsic theot y,"' blatant anticonpetitive cnnduct by
the defendants certainly will increase the court's comfort
level that the asset swap is indeed a "naked" restraint un
competition.
For examusple, iii applying the per se standard in Paln-r,the

Cou rt noted thai the price of fhe icncibhet liar review
course increased from $150 In over $4(0 immediately after
the asset sale went into ceffct. i' Judge Posncr in General
Leasing Aociationt also
Leaseways, Inc. v.National 1ruck
did a quick look to see if the restraint restricted coimpetition
and decreased output. ILikcwise, the Antitrust l)ivision noted
in the New 7hnls case that the defendants planned to, and in
some cases did, implement rate hikes after allocating markets,
which confirmed that the defendants' agreement was formed
effect, of raising advertising
for the purpose, and with tile
rates.15
Tile fact that the allocation agreement may enable the
competitors to better compete against other firms does nor
necessarily shield the allocation agreement from per se condetination."' But if dte two patties have low market shares,
the swap will enable theimt meaningfully to integrate assets in
order to produce a better product, and the parties' customers
support (or, at least, do not complain about) the swap, it is
unlikely that the asset swap's central purpose is to restrain
competition.
5, Non-Compete Provisions.The last factor to examine
is whether the swap contains any ancillary restraints on coinpetition, such as a non-compete provision. lfboth parties arc

free to re-enter their former markets, one could argue that
there is no market allocation agreement. But this freedom
may be illusory. When entry barriers or other economic factors effectively deter the parties from re-entering their former
markets, then the absence of a non-compere provision is not
determinative.1 But if the asset swap agreement contains
specific restraints on future competition, additional questions are raised about the asset swap's central purpose.
As ageneral rule, courts have upheld non-conilete provisions in asset purchase agreements when the rest raints ate tcasotsahly necessary ti) assure that purchaser can enjoy the fruits
of its acquisition, including goodwill." Sotte courts may
tiphold an asset swap, coupled with a non-conpete provision,
even though the conpetitors were motivated to enter into the
transaction to "escape the competition" with one other,'"
One court went so far as to declare that these non-compete
covenants are "tniformly" examined tinder the rule of reason
standard, and are "generally not recognized as antitrust violations."lu
But counsel should not rely exclusively on these sweeping
declarations, because other courts have recognized that a
covenant not to compete can be used as part of a scheme to
unlawfully allocate markets," In Palner, for example, an
asset sale coupled with a covenant not to compete amounted to a per se illegal market allocation scheme."
The sometimes confusing and inconsistent treatment of
non-compete provisions by the courts" may leave the lawyers
drafting the asset swap agreement scratching their heads:
should they include a non-compete provision or would the
provision generate more antitrust scrutiny than it is worth?
In considering any non-cotupete provision in an asset swap
transactill, coutinsel should consider two key questions.

First, are there sufficient real assets transferred oil which
to attach tile notn-conipete restraints, so that the restraints are
ancillary to (rather than the purpose of) the asset swap? As
Judge (later ChiefJustice) lft noted iver 100iyears ago the
theory underlying these ancillary restraints is that they pro-

mote the free purchase and sale ofhbusinesses, including the
businesses' goodwill:
It was ofihnportance, as an incentive to industry and honest

dealing in trade, that, after a man had built tp a business
with an extensive good will, he should be able to sell his business and good will to the hest advantage, and lie could not

do so unleis he could bind himself by an enlireahle ciintract
not to engage iii thesame business in snch a way as toipreve injury to ilii which lie was shout it) sell."

Conseqtently, the rationale for non-compete restraints is
that the temporary and limited loss of competition, if any, is
outweighed by the "long-run benefit of enhancing the marketability of the business itself-and thereby providing incentives to develop such an enterprise."" It follows that for the
restraint to be "ancillary," it cannot be the only or primary
asset transferred. As Judge Taft stated, "it]here is in such
contracts no main lawful purpose, to subserve which partial
testraint is permitted, and by which its reasonableness is
FALL
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O provisions to deter any new competitive entry into each

As a general rule, courts have upheld non.compete
provisions In asset purchase agreements when the
restraints are reasonably necessary to assure that
purchaser can enjoy the fruits of Its acquisition,
Including goodwill,

measured, bit the sole ohject is to cstrain trade in order to
avoid the competition which it has always heen the policy of
the common law to foster." 6" hus, if the purpose of the parties' agreement is not ro transfer any meaningful assets and
integrate them into the acquiring party's business, then any
non-compete restraints in the asset purchase agreement logically are not "ancillary" to a legitimate sale, but rather
'naked" restraints on competition.
As noted above, in the New Tirm' s case, none of the assets
associated with the actual operatins and goodwill of cither

of the defendants' shuttered alternative newsweeklies were
actually sold or integrated into the other defendant's
newsweekly, and the assets acrtually transferred were of little
value, even by the defendants' own calculations. As a result,
there were insufficient real assets to support the defendants'
contractual restraints oil competirion, which included:
0 essentially identical non-compete clauses in which each
defendant agreed not to publish an alternative newsweekly in the other defendant's market for at least ten years;

defendant's protected market. For example, Village Voice
Media agreed not to use, and to prevent anyone else from
Using, over a 10-year period its logo "Cleve'knd Free Times"
ill COtntittCi

with any CtrIent (i fitIre publilcation in

the greater Cleveland area. Similarly, New'l'iies agreed
not to use, and to prevent anyone else from using, its logo
"Netv Times LA" or any variant containing "New Times"
in connection with any current or future publication in

the greater Los Angeles area; and
* prohibitions on selling or otherwise making available any
of the fixed assets associated with each defendant's closed
ptublication tit any otf its former employees, consultants, or
independent contractors in tie affected markets."
These restraints were not stbordinate and collateral to
any proconpetitive integration of assets, but wele, as the
United States alleged, part of the defendants' overall plan to
gain a monopoly in its protected market.
The second question to consider is whether the restraint
is reasonably tailored in its scope (such as its duration, affected geogtphy, and activities) to protect each party'. legitimate
interests." For example, cies the restraint include product or
geographic narkets not involved in the asset sale? Ftdamentally, tie restraint shotlul he linmited to what is necessary
to place the asset purchaser in the same competitive position
as the seller at the time of the sale. Or, as Judge Bark stated,
"lilf it is so broad that part of tie restraint suppresses competition without creating efficiency, the restraint is, to that
extent, not ancillary.""'

to induce any advertiser to atdvrtisc in a coinlicting puilicarion over the next decade;
O requirements that each defendant redirect any traffic on its
closed weekly's Web site to the other defendant's Web site
for a period of one year, and to prominently state on irs
Web site that its alternative newsweeldy was no longer in
circulation;

Conclusion
An asset swap between competitors is a high risk transaction
because it resembles a per se illegal market allocation agreemcmit, Accordingly, counsel must determine the central purpose of the transaction: is it a legitimate, efficiency enhancing sale of real assets or is it a naked restraint of trade? '['he
five factors discussed in this article should help counsel in
making this critical detertnination.F"

11Is Arguable that the standard under § 7 of the Clayton Act differs from the
rule of reason standard under § 1 of the Sherman Act, In that the Clayton
Act reaches monopolistic tendencies in their Incipiency. See Brown Shoo Co.

Palmer v. ORG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990); U.S. v. Topco
Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); sea alio Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
U.S.. 175 U.S. 211 (1899), modifying and aff'p 85 F. 271 (6th Cir, 1898)

v, US., 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.33 (1962) (noting that the Senate committee

(Taft, J.).
See, e.g.,U.S. v. Andieas, 216 E3d 645. 666-67 (7th Cir. 2000); U.S. v.
Brown, 936 F.2d 1042, 1045 (9th Cit. 1991); U.S. v. Suntar Roofing, Inc.,
897 F2d 469, 473 (lOth Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Cooperative lieatres of Ohio,
Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1371 (6th Cir. 1988).
U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n. Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.2 12000), avalltehln at http://
www.ftcgov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
U.S. v. Village Voice Media, LLC and NT Media. LLC.Civ. Action No.
1:03CV0164 (N.D. Ohio 2003), Competitive Impact Statement at 11 (New
Tfmns CIS], available at http://www.usitoj.gnv/atr/cases/f200700/
200715.htm.

O commitments by each defendant not to solicit or atrempt

wished to make it clear that the Clayton Act was 'not intended to revert to
the Sherman Act test' but also "to cope with monopolistic tendencies In their
Incipiency and well hefore they have attained such effects as would justify
a Sherman Act proceeding"). Hut some courts today would dismiss this dis.
Unction. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rockford Menorlat Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1281
17th Cir. 1990) ('We doubt whethtr there is a substantive diffurence today
between the standard for judging the lawfulness of a merger challenged
under section 1 of the Sherman Act and the standard for Judging the same
merger challenged tinder section 7 of the Clayton Act.'); 2 Plumtp E. AprEnA
ANtiuuist LAw 304c, at 9 (1995).
& H01e1t0i HOVLNK.AM:
See, e.g., U.S. v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (bth Cir.
19801 ('The per se rule Is the trump cord of antitrust law, When an antitrust
plaintiff successfully plays it, he need only lally his score.').

1
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Id.; see also Palrner, 498 U.S. at 48 (combination formed for the purpose and
with the affect of fIxing prices Is illegal per so); Timken Roller nearing Co. v.
U.S., 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951) (where central purpose of agreement
is to allocate trade territories, restraints are per se illegal), overulei on other
ground,, Coppetweld Corp. v. Indupendence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(2984).

SSe Pulieet, 874 F.2d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1989), rey'd, 498 U.S. 46
(1990) (Supreme Court applied per se standard without regard to defendent's affidavit lhst it unlaterally decided to withdrew from market before
entering agreement); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Lifig.. 105 F. Supp. 2d 682,
701 n.13 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (court rejected as defense compony's tostlino
try that It unilaterally would not have entered market), offtf, 332 F.3d896 (61h
Cit. 2003).
Now Times CIS, supre note 6, at 6-10.
'OId. at 13.
11New Times Complaint, supra note 6, T 34, availtatle at htip://www.usdoJ,gov/
atr/cases/f200600/200673.htm.
11Toper, 405 U.S, at 609 n.10.
11 Palmer. 498 U.S. at 47.
t4 744 F.2d 588, 595-96 (7th Cit. 1984).
tl

Now TimesCIS, supra note 6, at 13.

lb Topco, 405 US. at 605, 610 (rejecting argument that by restricting compe.
tition In tI e sale of Topco brand goods, defendant association actually
increased competition against larger regional aird national chains); New
York o rol. Spitzer v. Saint Francis Hasp,, 94 F Supp, 2d 399, 417-18
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting claim that allocation agreement enabled defendante to offer patients a full panoply of services to effectively compete with
larger hospitals In the region).
1tSee Hawaii exrel, Anrai v. Gannett Pacific Corp., 99 F Stipp. ?d 1241,1251
(D. Haw.) (as defendant lacked infrastructure to publish newspaper, practical effect of defenaits agrerieenit was to eliminate competition), afrd, 203
F.3d 832 (9th Cit, 1999).
18Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2001); Perceptron, Inc.
v. Sensor Adaptive Mach., Inc., 221 F.3d 913, 919 (6th Cir, 2000): Polk
Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, :190 (7th Cir. 1985);
Addyirton Pipe 9 Sleel, 85 r. at 2R3.
19Perceptron, 221 F.3d at 919.
211Eichori,

248 F3d at 144-45.

21 Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. U.S., 334 U.S. 110. 119 (1948) (ronconpeto
agreements used in asset purchase agreemeints part ot defridant's illegal
monopolistic practices), overruled on otrer grounds, Copporweld Corp. v.
Independence TubeCorp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984): U.S. v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173,181 (1944) (non-compete provisions exceeded far
beyond proteftlon of business sold, and demonstrated clear intention to
monopolize theatre operation); U.S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106,183 (1911); Andrs Pharm., tic, v. Bloveil Corp. Intl, 256 F.3d 799,811
(D.C. CIr, 2001) logreeient's restraints not tailored to preserve lie status
quo between litigants but cal reasonably be viewed as attempt to allocate
market share); Curdieero COAnlitrust Lftlg., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 699 (agree.

ww w.

tso

ment to allocate U.S. territory to branded drug manufacturer per se illegal);
U.S. v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (non.
compete provisions not ancillary to legitimate sale but means of executing
market allocation scheme).
22 Palner. 498 U.S. at 47 n.2. fi oxchange for HBJs exclusive license of Its
"Bar/tri"name in Georgia, ORG agreed in 1980 not to compete withi HJ
outside Georgia. In 1982, a group of Georgia law students challenged this
agreement. The defendants settled and also modified their earlier written
agreement by deleting the non compote provision. Defendants wore sued
again by a second class of law students (those who took the bar review
course after Juite 1984), whiclh was tie action tlhat came before Ilie Supreme
Court, Although the defendants struck the non-compete provisions from
their written agreement, neither defendant was competing In the other's tarritnry. See 874 F.2d 1417, 1429-30 (1 th Cir. 19R9) (Clark, J., dissenting).
2 Aside front itle courts, even two FTC Commissioners Wore puzzled about tie
Commission's stance on non compete provisions in two coitemporaeeous
consent decrees, In lie General Mills consent decree, the Commission
urdeinmied un 18-inollti eoriconipete pruvislun Ipinted tu fe trirrulaucture
and sale of private label Chex cereal products. See Statement of Commissinner Mary L. Azcuenaga (Concurdng in Part and Dissenting in Part), and
Statement of Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Ill (Dissenting), in General
Mills, Inc,, FTCFile No. 961-0101, 62 Fed. Reg. 2.162 (Jan. 15, 1997). But
weeks earlier in the Ciba-Geigy consent decree, the Coritissioni imposed
an affirmative obligation on the newly merged entity not to compote In the
United States and Canada for six years In the sale of matlroprane-based flea
control products. Commission Statement In Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., FTC rile No.
961-0055, 82 Fed. Ra., 409 (Jan. 3, 1997.
21 Adlystrn Pipe A Steel, 85 F at 280.
21 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. U.S,, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978).
71 Addysfon Pipe 9 Stee, 85 F. at 283 84.
'

New Times CIS, supra note 6, at 9-10,
Compare Iekltro Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 060 F.2d 255. 267 (7th Cir. 1981t
(defendant enflced non.contpeto covenants to reasonable tre, space and
product limitations); Snap-On Tools Corp, v. FTC,321 F.2d825,836 (7th Cir.
1963) (no artltrust violation after one.year geographic non-compete restriction was amended from entire state to terminated dealers' former territories)
with Timkon, 341 U.S. at 598-99 (rntraintc Want beyond protection of sl'e
clflc trademark and provided for control of manufacture and sale of antlfriction beadngs outside the trademark): Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825,
828 f7th Cir. 3095) (iestrait's iilinito duration supports applicallurt of per
so standard); Cardizer CD Antitrust Lllg., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (per te
illegal territorial restraint barred competitor from marketing other bioequvalenl or generic verslors of drug which were not at issue In underlying
patent litigation).

z Rothery Storage & Van Co v. Alias Van Lines. Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C.
Cir. 1.986).
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